Derek Parfit 1 proposes that we separate the notions of identity and survival. This is a classical article in the 20th century analytical thought in philosophy. Derek Par t: A British philosopher, recently deceased. Consider next a claim like, 'Since her accident, she is no longer the same person'. Derek Parfit ical, or one and the same ball. Open University Press, pp. Par t’s Thesis: Personal identity does not matter for sur-vival, memory, or moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. I'm not entirely prepared to embrace his reductive theory of personal identity in all respects, but I'm deeply persuaded that whatever theory of personal identity we come to adopt, we'd do well to think much harder about the ways in which that identity over time can be said to be stable. If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was; but it will still be one and the same ball. DEREK PARFIT Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles I. ... DOWNLOAD PDF. FUTURE PEOPLE Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. In Vesey G (ed) Philosophy in the Open. by Derek Parfit 31 December 2007 In my book Reasons and Persons, I defended one view about the metaphysics of persons, and also claimed that personal identity is not what matters. IS PERSONAL IDENTITY WHAT MATTERS? More exactly: The article exposes the quintessence of Parfit's position in one of the most crucial problems of metaphysics, namely, the problem of personal identity and challenges the common-sense view on this topic. He … I shall briefly describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. This follows, he thinks, from the results of certain thought experiments—such as one put forth by David Wiggins—which seem to suggest that it is possible for A to survive into the future even if nobody will be identical to A at that time. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. Mostly an ethicist, but also dabbles in metaphysics. Penfield W (1975) The Mystery of the Mind. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2 Personal Identity through Time 92 Robert Nozick 3 Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters Derek Parfit 115 4 Survival and Identity David Lewis 144 5 Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit 168 Christine M. Korsgaard 6 Fission and the Focus of One's Life Peter linger 184 7 Surviving Matters Ernest Sosa 199 DEREK PARFIT PERSONAL IDENTITY AND RATIONALITY* There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. That involves both senses of identity. 2. 54-65. Par t is a partisan of the psychological criterion of personal identity (Psych =). Parfit D and Vesey G (1974) Brain Transplants and Personal Identity. Par t: Identity Doesn’t Matter 1. After we … personal identity are considered by Derek Parfit in a paper entitled “Personal Identity.” Parfit’s own view is expressed in terms of a relationship he calls “psychological continuity.” He analyses this relationship partly in terms of what he calls “q memory” (“q” stands for “quasi”). What matters in Personal Identity: A critique of David Lewis & Derek Parfit. It means that she, one and the same person, is not now the same person. Parfit D (1986) Reasons and Persons.